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You find out soon enough 
You should not speak with death 
For it is useless knowledge 
CHARLOTTE DELBO (1970) 
 
“What is it in us really that wants ‘the truth’?” Nietzsche asked – and granting that, “why not 
rather untruth? – and uncertainty? – ignorance even?” [BGE 1]. Perhaps there is no question 
today of greater import (and yet less often debated) than this one. Alfred North Whitehead 
once suggested that the history of philosophy is nothing but a series of footnotes to Plato. 
This may well be true. Certainly, it says something of Plato – and yet so much of our 
‘philosophy’ seems the plaything of one or another systemized set of presumptions – an 
exercise in various denials. It is in this light that Nietzsche arrives as a welcome exception. To 
my mind, he begins to ask the right questions. What is it in us that wants the truth, and, 
granting that, how can we even trust ourselves to know? – to want to know? – to be willing to 
know? – to be able? 
Where did we get this idea that truth would be without cost or consequences, harmless 
to behold?  So often we have assumed that truth would be universally ‘verifiable’, that 
knowledge can be ‘objectively’ transmitted, that these do not require of the knower some 
fundamental transformation from within. We have assumed, in other words, that knowledge 
doesn’t have an emotional or spiritual price. In contrast, Nietzsche says: “A thing might be 
true although it were harmful and dangerous in the highest degree; indeed, the basic 
constitution of existence might be such that one would be destroyed by a complete knowledge 
of it – so that the strength of a mind might be measured by how much ‘truth’ it could endure” 
[BGE 39]. 
If truth is unbearable, untruth, therefore, functions. Untruth, therefore, may well be only 
natural: “with all the value that may adhere to the true, the genuine, the selfless, it is possible 
that a higher and more fundamental value for all life might have to be ascribed to appearance, 
to the will to deception” [BGE 2]. Thus, one must ask: to what extent do our norms and 





precisely by virtue of their inherent untruth?  ‘The game’, as R.D. Laing once said, may well be 
‘the game of not seeing that we are playing the game’ (Laing 1970: ##). 
While no doubt fascinating in the abstract – these epistemological inquiries take on a 
life and death immediacy under less benign circumstances. ‘The game’ has a more critical 
reality. However Nietzsche may have come by them, most of his questions (and indeed, the 
very tensions and contradictions implicit in his thought) lie at the heart of what clinician Judith 
Herman has come to call “the dialectic of psychological trauma.” This “dialectic” represents a 
frightening, yet none the less predictable, set of existential conditions encountered by “rape 
survivors and combat veterans … battered women and political prisoners … the survivors of 
vast concentration camps created by tyrants who rule nations and the survivors of small, 
hidden concentration camps created by tyrants who rule their homes” (Herman 1992: 1). It is 
the telltale sign – the unmistakable mark, as it were – of what we least want to see, least want 
to hear, and least want to address or acknowledge. 
The dialectic of psychological trauma revolves around two antithetical poles: “the will 
to deny horrible events and the will to proclaim them aloud . . . 
The psychological distress symptoms of traumatized people simultaneously call attention 
to the existence of an unspeakable secret and deflect attention from it. This is most 
apparent in the way traumatized people alternate between feeling numb and reliving the 
event. The dialectic of trauma gives rise to complicated, sometimes uncanny alterations of 
consciousness, which George Orwell, one of the committed truth-tellers of our century, 
called “doublethink,” and which mental health professionals, searching for calm, precise 
language, call “dissociation” (47). 
Thus, an ongoing tension between Nietzsche’s ‘unbearable truth’ and a ‘functional deception’ 
all but defines the ‘disorder’ posttrauma.  Furthermore, “since neither the intrusive [truth] nor 
the numbing [function] symptoms allow for integration of the traumatic event ... the dialectic 
... is therefore potentially self-perpetuating” (47). “Eternal Recurrence” and “overcoming” 
under these circumstances take on a deeply personal connotation. The parallels between 
Nietzsche’s perspectives and those inherent in posttraumatic aetiology are tantalizing, if 





also stands as the date Pierre Janet published L’Automatisme Psychologique, the book that coined 
the term “dissociation” and the first book to overtly address psychological trauma.  
1. RAGE 
Traumatic experience makes one aware of immorality in a way that nothing else possibly 
could. It almost inevitably “involves understanding, at a deep experiential level, that one’s 
terror and pain were intentionally caused by another ... [One is] forced to acknowledge the 
existence of evil and the possibility of living in a morally bankrupt universe” (Janoff-Bulman 
1992: 78). 
In concert with this resonates Nietzsche’s philosophic agenda: both his relentless 
questioning of conventional assumptions, and even more primarily, conventional values. He is 
concerned with the so-called ‘death of God’, with the rising tide of nihilism, with the failures 
of our norms, with “how much hypocrisy, indolence, ... how much falsehood is concealed 
under the most honored type of contemporary morality” [BGE 212]. In these regards, 
Nietzsche is so strident, passionate, and emphatic that he often comes across like a madman 
or a raging prophet. However, his hostility to the traditional social order is very acute, and as 
Richard Bernstein has since observed: 
Some form of relativism seems to be a consequence of [his] lines of inquiry ... Nietzsche 
himself thought of such a relativism as a form of nihilism, the prevailing sickness that was 
spreading throughout Western culture and that he explored with such acuity. Yet it is a 
deeply troubling and perplexing question whether Nietzsche shows us any way out – any 
way to escape the nihilism that is so characteristic of modernity (1983: 14). 
Bernstein is, I think, essentially right. However, intellectual loyalty to the mores and 
concerns of the prevailing social order is a luxury enjoyed primarily by those who have never 
been mortally betrayed by them. Nietzsche’s paradox – his trail of “deeply troubling and 
perplexing” questions – takes on very different interpretations depending upon one’s 
experience of (or relation to) said social order. In confronting these questions, one would do 
well to remember that it is a presumption that the traditional social order and the traditional 





Nietzsche’s self-professed “immoralism” – his “Revaluation of all Values” – could well be an 
attempt to reassert (or a call to reestablish) an authentic moral order. Nietzsche’s own perspective 
concerning these matters is clear and unequivocal: Christian morality all but equals nihilism: 
“the will to nothing sanctified” [A 18]. 
I condemn Christianity. ... The Christian Church has left nothing untouched ... it has turned 
every value into an un-value, every truth into a lie, every integrity into a vileness of the 
soul. Let anyone dare to speak to me of its “humanitarian” blessings! To abolish any 
distress ran counter to its deepest advantages; it lived on states of distress. It created distress 
to externalize itself [A 62]. 
Grant the overall legitimacy of Nietzsche’s indictments (for the sake of argument, if 
nothing else), and the Revaluation becomes nothing less than “a courageous becoming 
conscious” [WP 1007]. The infamous Ubermensch (Overman) would therefore be one who has 
become strong enough to confront the situation honestly, and thus, having no need of 
recourse to denial, one who could evaluate honestly. “In other words,” as Walter Kaufmann 
succinctly put it, “Nietzsche believed that, to overcome nihilism, we must first recognize it” 
(1974: 110). 
2. WE 
We cannot respond to what we will not acknowledge, or do not recognize, and we often have 
little reason to do either. It is not difficult to comprehend the deep cognitive and social 
rupture created by random, malevolent experience. Like the Greeks before us, with their cosmos 
over chaos, we believe in order on a very deep-seated level.  The world is simply not seen as a 
random, malevolent, or meaningless place. In this respect, we are all inherently and 
unrealistically optimistic. Even if we verbally recognize the possibilities, we seldom 
acknowledge the realities, and we virtually never believe that we, personally, will be affected.   
As Janoff-Bulman has rightly observed, “Whether or not one accepts the existence of a deeper 
universal terror lying beneath our fundamental assumptions, the human tendency to perceive 





These matters have serious import, both philosophically, as Nietzsche clearly 
discovered, as well as in the realm of psychological trauma. “Every instance of severe 
traumatic psychological injury is a standing challenge to the rightness of the social order” 
(Judith Herman, quoted in Shay 1994a: 1) To confront such realities is inevitably to call into 
question not only integrity and trustworthiness of that social order, but also the security of 
one’s own metaphysical assumptions. It is much easier to simply “believe.” As Nietzsche 
extensively argued, “we have fixed a world for ourselves in which we can live by assuming 
[italics mine] ... [and] without these articles of faith [beliefs] nobody now could stand life” [GS 
121].
Granting the state of affairs portrayed here leaves one confronted with immediate and 
serious consequences, ethical foremost of all. When we have powerful motives not to listen or 
to deny the truth that confronts us, “events take place outside the realm of socially validated 
reality” (Herman 1992: 8). The world is thus divided. Consciousness (both individual and social) 
is likewise split asunder, and with that we arrive back at our point of departure: locked in 
silence, unable to respond, and back in the dialectic of psychological trauma. 
3. THE HISTORY OF AN ERROR 
The shape of this world we have fixed for ourselves – this socially validated reality – did not 
come about overnight. The ideas and presumptions which are for us today so normative as to 
be invisible (or sacred) are perhaps to a large extent innate in us by our very nature.  
Nonetheless, they do have a past and comprise an inheritance. “Not only the reason of 
millennia -- the madness of millennia too breaks out in us” [Z I, 22]. Questions, even the ones 
we generally choose to ignore, have been with us throughout our long history. 
Controversies as fresh as whether to admit to the possibility of post-traumatic personality 
changes ... go back to ancient roots. ... Plato (Apology 41d) has Socrates say, in his famous 
defense before the court that condemned him to death, ‘nothing can harm a good man 
either in life or in death,’ and again in the Republic we hear extensively argued that the good 
person cannot be harmed by the world. For Plato, the notable quality that a good man has 
is inextricably bound up with good breeding, in a particular aristocratic lineage. By the 
time we get to the Roman Stoics however, this possibility of unshakeable goodness, now 





it by good upbringing in childhood. In this form Christianity took up the idea and clothed 
it with the doctrine of God’s grace. By the late 18th century, it had been set in stone by 
Immanuel Kant, who said that which is truly deserving of ethical praise, blame, or true 
moral worth cannot be augmented or diminished by fortune. In the 20th century, 
psychoanalysis offered us as a ‘scientific’ result what the culture had already embraced, 
that no bad events could shake good character, once formed in childhood. ... 
Plato’s contemporaries [however] thought of him as a crank, not a philosopher, a word 
they reserved for the tragic poets like Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus, and above all, 
Homer. All of the tragic poets presented the destruction of good character by external 
events, particularly betrayal and bereavement. Among those whom subsequent ages also 
called philosophers, Aristotle undercut Plato’s position most powerfully, although there 
are times that Aristotle appears to endorse it and people argue and argue about where he 
really stood (Shay 1994b: ##). 
Nietzsche refers to this normative canonization of Plato’s Socratic vision as “the death 
of tragedy.” It is worth note that the ethical ideals of Neitzsche’s ‘revaluation’ are markedly 
Aristotelian (albeit, a pre-Christian Aristotelian), and beyond that clearly pre-Socratic.1 Even in 
his earliest work, the fundamental concerns are already forming: 
Consider the consequences of the Socratic maxims: ‘Virtue is knowledge; man sins only 
from ignorance; he who is virtuous is happy.’ In these three basic forms of optimism lies 
the death of tragedy ... now the transcendental justice of Aeschylus is degraded to the 
superficial and insolent principle of ‘poetic justice’ with its customary deus ex machina [BT 
14]. 
Now, while one could argue that Nietzsche was here mistaken (tragedy being not 
literally dead; history in the particulars being far more complex), the point might well be 
misguided. Nietzsche was ever a poet. While this is arguably both his greatest strength and his 
greatest weakness philosophically; metaphorically, the death of tragedy may have been just 
that: a critical and fundamental shift in the consensus understanding of the human condition. 
Nietzsche clearly had no time for a ‘just world’ theory and considered the ongoing 
appeal of Plato’s metaphysics (particularly as manifest in Christianity) to be both dishonest 
and socially dangerous – the “history,” as he put it, “of an error” [T II, 7]. “It is suffering that 
inspires these conclusions: fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist ... to 
imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one 





“the very things that the negating metaphysician most anxiously tries to eliminate – change, 
risk, transience – are themselves partly constitutive of the highest human values” (Nussbaum 
1986: 463). Order at any price inevitably entails deception. How we, by our natures (and this 
includes philosophers), would like the world to be and the actual conditions under which we 
live are two very different matters:  
All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual ... Death, change, 
age, as well as procreation and growth are for them objections – refutations even. What is, 
does not become; what becomes, is not. Now they all believe, even to the point of despair, 
in that which is. But since they cannot get hold of it, they look for reasons why it is being 
withheld from them. ‘It must be an illusion, a deception which prevents us from 
perceiving that which is: where is the deceiver to be found?’ – ‘We’ve got it,’ they cry in 
delight, ‘it is the senses!  These senses, which are so immoral as well, it is they that deceive us 
about the real world. ... Moral: denial of all that believes in the senses, of all the rest of 
[human]kind: all of that is mere “people” ... And away, above all, with the body, that 
pitiable idee fixe2 of the senses! infected with every error of logic there is, refuted, 
impossible even, notwithstanding it is impudent enough to behave as if it actually existed! 
[T II, 1].   
Nietzsche asserted a world where untruth functions: a world where what we know is 
profoundly swayed by what we most need to hold dear. Morality for Nietzsche (and in this I 
think he was correct) therefore ultimately means surrendering to the truth (including the truth of 
the body) no matter where it might lead, no matter how inexpedient it might be, and no matter 
how unkind.3  As he once wrote in Zarathustra, “Let us speak, you who are wisest, even if it be 
bad. Silence is worse; all truths that are kept silent become poisonous [italics mine]. And may everything 
be broken that cannot brook our truth!” [Z II, 12]. 
These few brief lines should strike a distinctly familiar chord with anyone currently 
working in the field of posttraumatic psychology, whether it be with sexual violence, political 
terror, or combat. In and of themselves, they may well comprise the only moral imperative by 
which the dialectic of psychological trauma can ever be genuinely confronted, if not overcome. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There are terrible questions – adrift, as it were, in the tension between truth and despair – in 





I were even able.  I am not at all certain they have answers. But in any event, that was never 
my intention. If the reader should have caught sight of them – a glimpse, at least, of their 
existence – then I will consider my efforts successful. 
As a philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche is dangerous, although not, I think, for the 
reasons usually given. To bear witness to realities that no one is willing to recognize or 
acknowledge – realities that threaten the very shape of our world and its order – is to risk 
public condemnation, censure, and isolation. Nietzsche’s censure and subsequent isolation are 
now legendary, and even today the public condemnation has never ended. Under different 
circumstances, I suspect audacity the likes of Nietzsche’s would be lauded as courageous. As it 
stands, he has been and continues to be – to use his own words – “misunderstood and for a 
long time thought the ally of powers he abhors” [UM III, 4]. 
If I am right about Nietzsche, our readiness to embrace certain presuppositions about 
him is anything but coincidental. Most of what I present here can probably be easily and 
effectively dismantled: interpreted away as merely the product of juxtaposition and selective 
quotation. And perhaps this is so. Nietzsche has proven, after all, to be notoriously easy to 
take out of context. My intuitions here will doubtless never be proven. But should they be 





Traumatic events call into 
question basic human 
relationships. They breach the 
attachments of family, 
friendship, love, and 
community.  They shatter the 
construction of the self that is 
formed and sustained in 
relation to others.  They 
undermine the belief systems 
that give meaning to human 
experience.  They violate the 
victim’s faith in a natural or 
divine order and cast the 
victim into a state of 
existential crisis. 
 
JUDITH HERMAN (1992) 
Never shall I forget those 
flames which consumed my 
faith forever. Never shall I 
forget that nocturnal silence 
which deprived me, for all 
eternity, of the desire to live.  
Never shall I forget those 
moments which murdered my 
God and my soul and turned 
my dreams to dust. Never 
shall I forget those things, 
even if I am condemned to 
live as long as God Himself.  
Never. 
 
ELIE WIESEL (1958) 
Whither are we moving? ...  
Are we not straying as though 
through an infinite nothing?  
Do we not feel the breath of 
empty space? Has it not 
become colder? ... God is 
dead. God remains dead. And 
we have killed him.” 
Here the madman fell silent 
and looked again at his 
listeners ... “I come too early,” 
he said then; “my time is not 
yet. This tremendous event is 
still on its way ... deeds, 
though done, still require time 
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1 Kaufmann, 382.  “The position of the allegedly Heraclitean and irrationalistic Nietzsche is to be 
found – superbly formulated – in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: ‘the good man ought to be a lover of 
self, since he will then act nobly, and so both benefit himself and aid his fellows’ ... Aristotle’s 
megalopsychia [Greatness of Soul] ... apparently made a tremendous impression on Nietzsche, whose 
opposition to Christianity can scarcely be seen in proper perspective apart from Aristotle’s ethics.” 
2 Idee fixe. [Fr. obsession (fixed idea)] – another phrase associated with none other than Pierre Janet, who 
used the term to describe the distinct, voiceless, and unyielding nature of posttraumatic recollection: 
what some contemporary psychologists have since come to call “body memory.” 
3 This conviction is a constant with Nietzsche from beginning to end, e.g., a letter to his sister, written 
while still a young man in 1865: “Is it decisive after all that we arrive at that view of God, world, and 
reconciliation which makes us feel most comfortable? ... Do we after all seek rest, peace, and pleasure 
in our inquiries?  No, only truth – even if it be the most abhorrent and ugly (cf. Kaufmann, 23). 
